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Abstract: Critical infrastructure technology vendors will inevitability take 
advantage of the benefits offered by the cloud computing paradigm. While this 
may offer improved performance and scalability, the associated security threats 
impede this progression. Hosting critical infrastructure services in the cloud 
environment may seem inane to some, but currently remote access to the 
control system over the internet is commonplace. This shares the same 
characteristics as cloud computing, i.e., on-demand access and resource 
pooling. There is a wealth of data used within critical infrastructure. There 
needs to be an assurance that the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
this data remains. Authenticity and non-repudiation are also important security 
requirements for critical infrastructure systems. This paper provides an 
overview of critical infrastructure and the cloud computing relationship, whilst 
detailing security concerns and existing protection methods. Discussion on the 
direction of the area is presented, as is a survey of current protection methods 
and their weaknesses. Finally, we present our observation and our current 
research into hosting critical infrastructure services in the cloud environment, 
and the considerations for detecting cloud attacks. 
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1 Introduction 
Critical infrastructures include sectors such as energy resources, finance, food and water 
distribution, health, manufacturing, government services and in some cases people. The 
consequences of an attack on one of these could result in loss of life, economic damage 
or a devastating effect on the operation of government services and military defence. In 
recent years, critical infrastructures have become increasingly more interlinked and are 
often connected to the internet; consequently, this makes these systems more vulnerable 
and exposed to the threat of cyber attacks (Hurst, 2011). In this paper, we refer to critical 
infrastructure as those whose disruption could have a high socioeconomic impact. The 
critical infrastructure systems that support major industries, such as manufacturing, 
transportation, and energy, are highly dependent on information communication systems 
for their command and control. While a high dependence on industrial control systems, 
i.e., supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) still exists, critical infrastructure 
systems are migrating to new communication technologies. As a result, common 
communications protocols and open architecture standards are replacing the diverse and 
disparate proprietary mechanics of industrial control systems. This replacement can have 
both positive and negative impacts (Department of Homeland Security, 2009). 
Utilising cloud computing within an environment that historically has not had any 
internet connectivity would appear trivial to some, however research has shown that 
cloud computing will reach the information and communication technology (ICT) 
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services that are operating critical infrastructure (Dekker, 2013; OTE, 2012; Khajeh-
Hosseini et al., 2010). Operators of critical infrastructures, in particular the ICTthat 
supports gas and electricity utilities and government services, are considering using the 
cloud to provision their high assurance services. This is reflected in a recent white paper 
produced by the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) (Dekker, 
2013), which provides specific guidelines in this area. 
Deploying high assurance services in the cloud increases cyber security concerns, as 
successful attacks could lead to outages of key services that our society depends on, and 
disclosure of sensitive personal information. To address these concerns, a range of 
security measures must be put in place, such as cryptographic storage and network 
firewalls. Industrial control systems have evolved from being monolithic, to distributed, 
to networked. Remote access is common practice, i.e., remote access to intelligent 
electronic devices (IEDs) or user interfaces in a substation for maintenance. In addition, 
historians within the infrastructure can take operational and production data from the 
SCADA environment and publish it to web assessable portals to be viewed by corporate 
users. Automation has become an indispensable part of service provision and has 
increased exponentially, as demand for digital services and interconnectivity has 
increased. The reliance on these systems has resulted in ICT playing a key role in the 
provisioning of services that critical infrastructures deliver to the general population. 
Cloud computing can be conveyed as the next logical progression as the cloud paradigm 
is already being used for crucial assets within the critical infrastructure industry. 
The aim of this paper is to provide an outline of the cloud computing and critical 
infrastructure connexion, conveying the evident utilisation by critical infrastructure 
technology vendors, and highlighting the security concerns and subsequent disinclination 
to host services in this environment. Requirements for cloud computing for critical 
infrastructure will be defined; in addition, a use case will express some benefits of 
adopting this approach. We will expand on our observation of this area and detail our 
research into the use of predictive algorithms, such as CUSUM, for detecting attacks 
against the cloud, i.e., distributed denial of service (DDoS) for unavailability of data, 
which, if it was infrastructure data would cause high operational and financial loss. 
Transfer of data is time critical within these systems, and availability of services is 
imperative, thus disruptions could have high socioeconomic impact. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides background 
on critical infrastructure and cloud computing, detailing their relationship, and associated 
security concerns. Section 3 illustrates cloud computing requirements for critical 
infrastructure and describes a use case based on our previous work. In Section 4, we 
compare numerous protection methods for cloud computing and highlight their 
weaknesses; we discuss algorithms for detecting cloud attacks, and offer insight on this 
area. Finally, we present our conclusions and future work in Section 5. 
2 Background 
2.1 Critical infrastructure 
Critical infrastructures deliver critical services that are keys to economy, safety of people, 
the community, and the functioning of government. They are key service providers 
greatly relied upon by governments and the general population. There are other 
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infrastructures society relies upon, but they are not considered in the scope of this paper. 
Many critical infrastructure areas have become heavy ICT users with automation playing 
a key role in production. Use of ICT has also begun to expand in areas such as 
agriculture, food, and water where control systems and the use of sensor equipment are 
helping to facilitate production and become more adaptive to the growing demands being 
placed on them. 
Clearly, the use of ICT is becoming more pervasive in all areas of critical 
infrastructure (Hurst et al., 2013). These infrastructures face significant threats due to the 
growth in the use of SCADA systems and increasingly integrating networks. Although 
the complex infrastructure provides great capabilities for operation, control, business and 
analysis, it also increases the security risks due to cyber-related vulnerabilities (Ten et al., 
2010). The SCADA industry is transitioning from a legacy environment, in which 
systems were isolated from the internet and focused on reliability instead of security, to a 
modern environment where networks are being leveraged to help improve efficiency. 
There are similarities between critical infrastructure and cloud computing, as they are 
primarily large distributed data sets and may possess the same underlying issues. The 
emergence of the cloud computing paradigm could be beneficial for the operation and 
performance of these complex infrastructures. Adoption of cloud technologies allows 
critical infrastructure to benefit from dynamic resource allocation for managing 
unpredictable load peaks. 
2.2 Cloud computing 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines five essential 
characteristics of cloud computing (Mell and Grance, 2011): 
• On-demand self-service: A user should be able to acquire or release resources 
without requiring outside human interference. 
• Broad network access: Resources should be available over the network, through both 
thin and thick clients 
• Resource pooling: Resources are pooled to serve disparate customers on the same or 
different physical machines. Resources can by dynamically assigned according to 
customer demands. Resources can include computation, storage, and networking to 
name a few. 
• Rapid elasticity: Users can acquire, release, and scale resources in an elastic manner, 
making the available resources appear unlimited from the clients’ point of view. 
• Measured service: The cloud management layer constantly monitors, controls, and 
reports resource use to both the provider and client, providing a metering capability. 
Cloud providers usually build up large scale data centres and provide cloud users with 
computational resources in three delivery models, distinguished by their level of resource 
abstraction (Annapureddy, 2010). These are: 
• software as a service (SaaS) 
• platform as a service (PaaS) 
• infrastructure as a service (IaaS). 
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Security is a major concern in cloud adoption. Critical security issues include data 
integrity, user confidentiality, and trust among providers, individual users, and user 
groups. Additionally, availability issues and real world impact would be the main concern 
for providers of critical infrastructure, depending upon the operations or services they are 
hosting (Hwang and Li, 2010). There are security issues at each level of the cloud 
computing paradigm. These levels are application level, virtual level, and physical level. 
The application level comprises of SaaS, in which enterprises host and operate their 
applications over the internet so the customers can access it. One benefit of this model is 
customers do not need to buy any software licences or any additional equipment for 
hosting the application(s). 
The virtual level includes PaaS and IaaS. PaaS provides a platform for building and 
running customer applications. Enterprises can build applications without installing any 
tools on their local systems and can deploy them with relative ease. IaaS provides a 
convenient option for organisations by migrating the IT infrastructure to the cloud 
provider. This means it is the responsibility of the cloud provider to tackle the issues of 
IT infrastructure management, such as configuring servers, routers, firewalls, to name a 
few. The physical level refers to the infrastructure upon which clouds are deployed. Table 
1 conveys security requirements and threats for each service level. 
Cloud deployment models include public, private, community, and hybrid: 
• A public cloud is available to the general public or large industry group, owned by 
an organisation selling cloud services. A third party provides infrastructure, platform 
and software. The management, operational, and security requirements are 
provisioned and shared between users and providers with a service level agreement 
(SLA). 
• A private cloud operates for a single organisation. The infrastructure can be located 
in the organisational unit or in a third party unit's data centre. Private clouds grant 
complete control over how data is managed and what security measures are in place. 
There are two types of private cloud: 
1 On-premise: This is a cloud that has been integrated into an organisation’s IT 
process. These clouds are better suited for organisations which desire greater 
configurability and control over their data infrastructure. 
2 External private cloud: This is a private cloud platform that is hosted by an 
external cloud provider, but with the guarantee of privacy. 
• A community cloud is shared by several organisations, supporting a specific 
community. The infrastructure is placed in more than one organisation in the 
community or third party's data centre. Management and operational tasks are split 
between data centre owner, organisations and third party. 
• Hybrid clouds are the combination of more than one cloud deployment model, as 
previously described. All the infrastructure, platform and software are portable and 
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Table 1 Security requirements and threats associated with each service level 
Level Service level Security requirements Threats 
Application 
level 
SaaS • Access control 
• Communication 
protection 
• Data protection from 
exposure  
• Privacy in 
multitenant 
environment 
• Service availability 
• Software security 
• Data interruption  
• Exposure in network  
• Interception 
• Modification of data  
• Privacy breach 
• Session hijacking 
• Traffic flow analysis 
Virtual level PaaS 
 
IaaS 
• Access control 
• Application security 




• Data security  
• Secure images 
• Virtual cloud 
protection 
• Connection flooding 
• DDoS attack 
• Defacement 
• Disrupting communications 
• Exposure in network 
• Impersonation 
• Programming flaws 
• Software modification 
• Software interruption  
• Session hijacking 
• Traffic flow analysis 
Source: MacDermott et al., (2013) 
The adoption of this innovative architecture may introduce a number of additional threats 
that vendors may not have considered. Based on the problem at hand, it is evident that 
sufficient security metrics need to be developed for protecting the sensitive data being 
stored in the cloud environment. The ability to clearly identify, authenticate, authorise, 
and monitor who or what is accessing the assets of an organisation is essential for 
protecting an information system from threats and vulnerabilities. The focus on 
cybercrime at a global level has led to ‘as-a-service’ models for illegal activity. The 
cybercrime market now affords potential criminals with a multitude of services, which 
means that deep technical expertise is not a prerequisite. Much like cloud computing, the 
service-based nature of cybercrime allows greater efficiency and flexibility when 
conducting business. Examples include the ability to rent services that offer financial 
return or that claim to be able to bring down entire sites or systems (Samani, 2013). 
3 Cloud computing and critical infrastructure 
Moving services to the cloud is a trend that has been present for many years now, with a 
constant increase in sophistication and complexity of such services. Today, even critical 
infrastructure operators are considering moving their services and data to the cloud; most 
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prominently are telecommunication operators, who aim to run their services as virtual 
network services. These services are usually composed from a set of components, each 
with individual resilience and scalability requirements. Hence, the problem of describing 
the blueprint of how to build a service from its components, including the components’ 
requirements, and how to derive an actual deployment from such a blueprint needs to be 
resolved (Scholler et al., 2013). 
Since ICT infrastructures have become an integral part of almost all organisations, 
cloud computing will have an important impact on them (OTE, 2012). Cloud services can 
offer efficient access to large ICT infrastructures that benefit from the economy of scale, 
which can be replicated and distributed globally. Cloud computing addresses at least two 
fundamental requirements of the UK energy industry community. First, accurate network 
simulations require highly variable quantities of computational resources depending on 
the contingent situation of energy delivery or on the type of energy delivered. Renewable 
energy output is typically much less predictable than the constant output offered by 
conventional generation sources, such as coal, oil, gas, or nuclear. For this reason, 
running simulations on the cloud allows for dynamic scaling of the required 
computational and data resources. 
In some critical infrastructure, it is not just the data that is critical; it is the remote 
terminal units (RTUs) and programmable logic controllers (PLCs) running pumps or 
maintaining the turbines. Each infrastructure may vary its migration to the cloud 
environment, but what is clear is that when the data is in the cloud, its availability, and 
integrity are of utmost importance. Remote access into a SCADA system over the 
internet is commonplace for corporate staff to observe and analyse the information 
collected by the historians. In this instance, it is the data from the infrastructure that is 
critical. A further way in which infrastructure vendors could embrace the benefits of the 
cloud environment could involve storing the historian processes in an onsite private 
cloud. 
Many operators do not have the infrastructure to support the growing need for 
accurate predictive and historical simulations imposed by the adoption of renewable 
energy sources and the ongoing development of smart grids. Cloud computing allows 
these operators to reduce or avoid over investment in hardware resources and their 
associated maintenance. Infrastructure vendors will inevitably take advantage of the 
benefits cloud computing has to offer. 
3.1 Use case 
Previous work of ours (MacDermott et al., 2013) has outlined a way in which critical 
infrastructure could utilise the cloud environment for improved performance and analysis 
of the automation processes. Most industrial plants employ networked historian servers 
storing process data and other possible business and process interfaces. PLCs in the 
control system generate a vast amount of data and logs. These communication logs are 
stored in the historian databases. This historical data is being logged 24/7, and in some 
cases can come from over 6,700 data points, so that it could be easily accessible by both 
operators and engineers (Fovino et al., 2010; Verba, 2008). These historian servers 
receive data from field control processors or front-end processors, which issue control 
commands to and poll data from devices in field networks. Figure 1 illustrates a high 
level arrangement of general critical infrastructure components. 
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Figure 1 Critical infrastructure components (see online version for colours) 
 
The control network typically contains assets such as the human-machine interface 
(HMI) and other workstations, which run control system applications on conventional 
computer platforms. The field network devices directly monitor and control a physical 
process, such as refining, manufacturing, or electric power generation/ 
transmission/distribution (Briesemeister et al., 2010). 
One way for critical infrastructure to utilise the cloud environment would be for the 
historian database to send these historical processes to a private cloud. The use of a 
private cloud to audit the data from the system and process it more effectively would be 
valuable. This would overcome the challenges associated with processing vast data sets 
generated by the control systems. The cloud environment is suitable as it has massive 
storage and computational capabilities, is distributed and elastic, offering improved 
processing rates and efficiency compared to current methods. 
This collection of data can be used to perform behavioural analysis and modelling of 
the flow of information. Looking for trends and subtle changes in the data would be 
beneficial in achieving state awareness. Behaviour modelling can take place without 
affecting the system in any way. In control system architectures, the major cyber-attack 
vector is the flow of network commands (Carcano et al., 2003). By processing the sensor 
data from the historian in a private cloud environment, the behaviour of the infrastructure 
could be analysed to discriminate between critical states due to cyber-attacks and critical 
states due to faults/physical attacks. 
Another advantage of using the cloud in this context is to aggregate data from the IP 
enabled control devices, which have limited resources and cannot process data locally. 
Though there are benefits of this connection, one of the main concerns with utilising 
critical infrastructure services in the cloud environment is the threat of attack. Critical 
infrastructure providers will use cloud applications for their systems and related issues 
need to be investigated. Especially, with critical infrastructure in the cloud, legal 
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compliance will be a vital importance (Florian et al., 2013). Critical infrastructure data is 
normally highly sensitive and therefore subject to legal regulations for data security. 
Traditionally critical infrastructure secured data inside a closed environment with 
restricted external access. This makes it important to establish data access regulations to 
secure critical infrastructure data in the cloud. 
3.2 Requirements for critical infrastructure 
The cloud computing operational model is a major recent trend in the ICT industry, 
which has gained tremendous momentum. This trend will likely also reach the ICT 
services that support critical infrastructures, because of the potential cost savings and 
benefits of increased resilience due to elastic cloud behaviour. However, employing 
critical infrastructure services in the cloud introduces security and resilience requirements 
that existing offerings do not address well. For example, due to the opacity of cloud 
environments, the risks of deploying cloud-based critical infrastructure services are 
difficult to assess, especially at the technical level, but also from legal or business 
perspectives. 
Though there are many benefits and advantages regarding the utilisation of cloud 
computing by critical infrastructure operators there are considerations that must be 
deliberated. Requirements in critical infrastructure regarding overall redundancy, data 
availability, authenticity, secure access, and low latency network connectivity are 
typically higher than in commercial applications. Critical infrastructure imposes much 
stronger requirements for security, reliability, and resilience on cloud computing 
environments. 
• Control 
A SLA defines how the consumer will use the services and how the provider will 
deliver them. Responsibilities of each party and remedies should be included. The 
SLA cannot be adapted or negotiated, which often deters organisations from 
pledging fully to the cloud. Additionally, there is no governing body, and no one 
enforcing this compliance. In this scenario, there may be data breaches that are often 
undisclosed to the affected party. Control is a common challenge as depending on 
which deployment model is chosen, control is not always in the hand of the owner. 
Private clouds allow organisations to shape how their data is stored and controlled, 
and what security measures are in place. Public clouds raise the questions: where is 
the data stored? Who has control? In this instance, public clouds do not seem the 
viable option. 
• Data centric security approach 
In general, a data-centric security approach must ensure that data protection 
mechanisms are deployed across all provided security solutions and that data owners 
have the full control over who has the right to access, use the data and what they are 
authorised to do with it. In addition, institutional security policies and access rules 
can be specified and mapped to the cloud environment. Requirement based security 
issues can be quite different for critical infrastructure applications and for common 
IT applications but need to be considered in combination for the given context. 
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• Protection 
Since cloud computing supports a distributed service oriented paradigm, multi-
domain and multi-users administrative infrastructure, it is more prone to security 
threats and vulnerabilities, such as data breaches, data loss, service hijacking, DDoS 
attacks, to name a few (Bhadauria, 2011). Tailored intrusion detection and 
prevention mechanisms are essential. Compared to other systems and services in the 
cloud environment, a critical infrastructure requires a much higher level of 
assurance. One of the risks in a multi-tenant environment is over provisioning of 
resources. Over provisioning resources results in resource contention and potential 
lack of availability, effectively creating a denial of service situation (Steiner, 2012). 
This could have an impact on users of the cloud service who depend on its 
continuity. An example of such a requirement is when critical services, such as 
emergency care, depend on these cloud services. 
• Legal issues 
Legal requirements include data protection and regulatory requirements. Issues also 
surround data being exchanged across multiple countries that have different laws and 
regulations concerning data traversal, protection requirements and privacy laws. 
Examples of such risks include, but not limited to, risks resulting from possible 
changes of jurisdiction and the liability or obligation of the vendor in case of loss of 
data and/or business interruption (Dahbur et al., 2011). There are also geographical 
requirements for healthcare data being stored, which could have legal ramifications 
if violated. 
4 Methods for intrusion detection in the cloud environment 
Based on the critical infrastructure requirements for cloud computing, we analysed the 
literature for solutions that may be applicable for protecting these services. There are 
many taxonomies detailing cloud vulnerabilities and attacks (Khajeh-Hosseini et al., 
2010; Karnwal et al., 2012; Chonka and Abawajy, 2012; Aliyev et al., 2013; Dahbur et 
al., 2011; Grobauer et al., 2011). As such, it can be inferred that as the use of the cloud in 
organisations develops, so will the rate of DDoS attacks. These attacks against the cloud 
are launched to deny service availability to end users. While DDoS attacks tend to 
generate a lot of fear and media attention, they are by no means the only form of DDoS 
attack. Asymmetric application-level DDoS attacks take advantage of vulnerabilities in 
web servers, databases, or other cloud resources, allowing a malicious individual to take 
out an application using a small attack payload – in some cases less than 100 bytes long 
(Cloud Security Alliance, 2013). 
Unavailability of services due to cloud outages can cause monetary loss to cloud 
providers and operational loss to cloud users, which would be disastrous for critical 
infrastructure as another service could be dependent upon it. Hosting infrastructure 
services, and storing sensitive data in the cloud environment brings with it security and 
resilience requirements that existing cloud services are not well placed to address. The 
most common mechanism for protecting the cloud environment currently are intrusion 
detection systems (IDSs). These mechanisms require an extensive use of hardware, 
especially CPU and memory, and may cause unintentional resource exhaustion or a 
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bottleneck. IDSs can observe the traffic from each virtual machine (VM), generating alert 
logs and can manage cloud computing globally.  
As IDSs generate substantial amounts of logs, administrators have to prioritise what 
to analyse first. It is often difficult to analyse logs as communications a vast number of 
systems and consumers generate large quantities of logs. Effective log and resource 
management is necessary, as an administrator may miss imperative alerts and events, thus 
endanger their system(s). In the cloud environment, where avast amount of data is 
generated due to high network access rates, an IDS must be robust against noise data and 
false positives. Since cloud infrastructures have enormous network traffic, traditional 
IDSs are not efficient to handle such a large data flow. 
The work of Hamad and Al-Hoby (2012) takes an innovative approach to tackling 
this security problem. They designed and implemented the ‘Cloud Intrusion Detection 
Service’ (CIDS). CIDS can be deployed by cloud providers to enable clients to subscribe 
to the IDS in a service-based manner, i.e., ‘security-as-a-service’. It is a re-engineered 
version of Snort, which is an open-source network intrusion prevention and detection 
system (IDS/IPS). The model outperforms current solutions used for service-based IDS 
but at the same time provides minimal overhead comparable to traditional IDS 
deployment for single network protection. 
In the work of Dhage et al. (2011), it is conveyed that when there is only one IDS in 
the entire network, the load on it increases as the number of hosts increases. It is difficult 
to keep track of different kinds of attacks or intrusions, which are acting on each of the 
hosts present in the network. An architecture in which mini IDS instances are deployed 
between each user of the cloud and the cloud service provider is proposed. As a result, 
the load on each IDS instance will be less than that on a single IDS and for this reason, 
the small IDS instance will be capable of working in an in increasingly efficient manner. 
By proposing a model in which each instance of IDS has to monitor only a single user, an 
effort has been made to create a coordinated design, which will be able to gather 
appropriate information about the user, thus enabling it to classify intrusions in a better 
way. 
The work of Lee et al. (2011) proposes a multi-level IDS and log management 
method. Their method is based on consumer behaviour for applying IDS effectively to 
the cloud system. A risk level is assigned to user behaviour based on analysis of their 
behaviour over time. By applying differentiated levels of security strength to users, based 
on the degree of anomaly, this increases the effective usage of resources. Their method 
proposes the classification of generated logs by anomaly level. This is so that the system 
administrator analyses logs of users suspected of being the highest risk to the system first. 
Arshad et al. (2013) propose intrusion severity analysis for the cloud environment. 
Their work focuses on application-specific vulnerabilities. They establish a severity 
analysis for the overall architecture through the use of decision trees, which are a 
supervised learning approach. The main objective is to investigate the effectiveness of 
machine learning techniques for severity analysis for cloud environments. The fault 
model consists of arbitrary intrusions but excludes faults that occur at site level, i.e., if the 
hypervisor or domain is compromised. 
In Mahmood and Agrawal (2012), PCANNA (principal component analysis neural 
network algorithm) is proposed to reduce the memory and CPU time required to detect an 
attack. Feature reduction is used to remove insignificant information from the high 
dimensional database of cloud traffic data. A back propagation algorithm is applied on 
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reduced cloud traffic data for classification. Dimensional reduction techniques compact 
and correlate similar alerts to detect intrusions that are more complex. 
Our survey of existing methods has identified the current weaknesses with existing 
approaches: 
• fail or overload with a high volume of traffic 
• loss of accuracy 
• inaccurate profile of usage 
• require human intervention 
• simply flags suspect behaviour 
• ineffective log management 
• cannot detect novel/unknown attacks. 
While these weaknesses are challenging and need to be addressed, a common occurrence 
in the literature was the inefficiencies of algorithms for detecting attacks in the cloud 
environment. New algorithms optimised for detecting cloud attacks in an efficient 
manner are needed, and this is something we are currently exploring. Additionally, 
having a solution with the ability to adapt to varying computational and network loads in 
order to not be invasive is needed also. In the service-oriented architecture of the cloud, 
collaboration means data is coming from many different sources so existing IDS 
techniques will not be able to process data of this scale. Distributed systems need to 
maintain a balance between communication overheads and the addition of process power, 
as resources can become constrained. Distributed IDS detect attacks by analysing large 
sets of traffic. This traffic is often analysed by taking a sample, and a large percentage of 
attacks can be detected quite quickly, whereas novel attacks are often missed. 
4.1 Algorithms for detecting attacks in the cloud 
We analysed algorithms for detecting attacks in the cloud environment, and looked in 
particular at adaptive threshold, random early drop (RED), robust random early drop 
(RRED), and CUSUM. Each of these are used by a variety of solutions in this area, but 
each have differing benefits and drawbacks. Adaptive threshold (Gore, 2012) detects 
anomalies based on violations of a threshold that is adaptively set based on recent traffic 
measurements. Seasonal variations and trends are taken care of by using an adaptive 
threshold whose value is set based on an estimate of the mean number of packets under 
consideration or the rate, either of which are computed from recent traffic measurements. 
RED takes a different approach and monitors the average queue size and drops 
packets based on statistical probabilities. If the buffer is almost empty, all incoming 
packets are accepted. As the queue grows, the probability for dropping an incoming 
packet grows too. When the buffer is full, the probability has reached 1 and all incoming 
packets are dropped. In comparison, RRED was proposed to improve the TCP throughput 
against DDoS attacks, particularly Low-rate DDoS (LDDoS) attacks. Experiments have 
confirmed that the existing RED-like algorithms are notably vulnerable under LDDoS 
attacks due to the oscillating TCP queue size caused by the attacks. RRED algorithm can 
significantly improve the performance of TCP under Low-rate Denial-of-Service attacks. 
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Many algorithms, such as random sampling, do not take into account traffic 
dynamics. As a result, they cannot guarantee the sampling error falls within a prescribed 
error tolerance level. How to discover the evolving process of the network traffic and 
how to improve the accuracy of real-time detection is problematic. In regards to critical 
infrastructure services in the cloud environment, the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of the data are of utmost importance. 
CUSUM (Cárdenas et al., 2011) involves the calculation of a cumulative sum (which 
is what makes it ‘sequential’). Samples from a process Xn are assigned weights Wn and 




max(0, )n n n n
S
S S x w+
=
= + −  
When the value of S exceeds a certain threshold value, a change in value has been found. 
The formula only detects changes in the positive direction. 
There are preventive measures in place to protect against such attacks, but they seem 
to be focusing on generic DDoS, where the characteristics mimic previous attacks of such 
nature. However, the rise in high volume and low rate DDoS is a problem. They could be 
spread out over a period of time, and have random high bursts, which can confuse the 
preventative measures. Algorithms for detecting DDoS attacks in the cloud environment 
often sample the packets and drop any they deem to be malicious. These can often be 
false positives. 
Our research focuses on maintaining the availability of the data, as previously 
described, the service in question could be financial, organisational, or on demand. 
Protecting the cloud environment from DDoS attacks is on the increase. Cyber-crimes 
targeting organisations in the cloud environment are rising and the malicious nature is to 
prevent the availability of data. Having analysed these algorithms for their suitability, we 
have identified the following weaknesses in regards to detecting DDoS in the cloud 
environment: 
• sample packets are often inaccurate 
• vulnerability to unknown types of DDoS attacks 
• does not always ensure the accuracy of estimation and tend to over sample at peak 
periods when efficiency and timeliness are crucial 
• random sampling does not take into account traffic dynamics 
• inefficient on low rate DDoS attacks 
• prone to error on high-rate DDoS attacks. 
There is an emerging need for the traffic processing capability of IDS, to match the high 
throughput of today’s high-bandwidth networks. Recent research has shown that the vast 
majority of security solutions deployed today are inadequate for processing traffic at a 
sufficiently high rate to keep pace with the network’s bandwidth. However, existing 
sampling algorithms are poorly suited for this task, especially because they are unable to 
adapt to the trends in network traffic. Satisfying such a criterion requires a sampling 
algorithm to be capable of controlling its sampling rate to provide sufficient accuracy at 
minimal overhead. 
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The adaptive threshold algorithm and CUSUM algorithm appear to be the most 
applicable for detecting attacks in the cloud environment. Our current work involves 
testing this hypothesis against real network data to determine the effectiveness of 
protecting critical infrastructure services in the cloud environment and to maintain 
availability of the data through predictive responsiveness. We seek to investigate how the 
parameters of the detection algorithm and the characteristics of the attack affect the 
performance. Currently, we have analysed these two predictive algorithms against values 
we have generated using numPY in Python. We have used the semantics of the 
algorithms and applied them syntactically. Matplotlib is used to plot the observed values 
on a graph to illustrate if they have exceeded the exponentially-weighted moving average 
(EWMA) threshold. Early detection of DoS attacks with increasing intensity would 
enable defensive actions to be taken earlier. Algorithms based on change point detection, 
such as CUSUM, can exhibit robust performance over a range of different types of 
attacks, without being more complex. 
Next, we are to test the algorithms in a cloud environment and return a truple of the 
start time, the end time, and returning a list of values per minute/second. In addition, 
comparing the performance of the detection algorithms in terms of three metrics: 
detection probability, false alarm ratio and detection delay. 
4.2 Discussion 
The scope of critical infrastructure transcends into industry, which is broadly defined and 
highly distributed. The term ‘critical infrastructure’ does not help security practitioners or 
policy makers, but the term ‘critical assets’ may. By calling a whole system critical can 
describe a class of objects or phenomenon in general terms, without specific details or 
attention to individual attributes. Not everything will be deemed critical, but the data can 
be. That which is critical, in terms of data, for one organisation may not be crucial for 
another, but when it is infrastructure services, or important historical processes it is. The 
criteria for data/or asset criticality can differ depending on infrastructure but we refer to it 
as essential for the functioning of operations. Data which is required to be viewed in real 
time can be deemed critical, or assets such as PLCs operating in real time could also be 
too. Currently there are no satisfactory solutions available to address the issues of 
intrusion detection in the cloud environments for critical infrastructure system protection. 
New algorithms optimised for detecting cloud attacks in an efficient manner are needed, 
and this is something we are currently exploring. We seek to investigate how the 
parameters of the detection algorithm and the characteristics of the attack affect the 
performance. 
Our main aim is to derive new algorithms optimised for detecting cloud specific 
security threats to Cloud Computing infrastructures. This will occur through the analysis 
of various intrusion and anomaly detection algorithms and measurable cloud computing 
parameters, such as communication types, communication patterns, and access patterns, 
which can be used to detect and isolate abnormal behaviour and threats. Mechanisms can 
be in place to detect generic DDoS attacks; however, high-scale and small-scale attacks 
are still possible since these types of attacks differ from normal bandwidth hungry 
applications. 
As cloud computing grows in popularity, new models are deployed to exploit its full 
capacity. One of these ideas is the deployment of cloud federations. A cloud federation is 
an association among different cloud service providers (CSPs) with the goal of sharing 
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resources and data. In order to cope with the resource capacity limits of a single cloud 
provider, the concept of federating multiple heterogeneous organisations is receiving 
increasing attention. Critical infrastructure vendors could adopt this approach. The effects 
of attacks can span from the loss of some data, to the potential isolation of parts of the 
federation (Macdermott et al., 2013). Protecting the federated cloud against cyber attacks 
is a key concern, since there are potentially significant economic consequences. Cloud 
federation and CSPs will benefit significantly if there is a comprehensive IDS that 
evolves based on their requirements. This is an area we aim to additionally consider. 
The distributed and open structure of cloud computing and services becomes an 
attractive target for potential cyber attacks by intruders. The traditional intrusion 
detection and prevention systems are largely inefficient to be deployed in cloud 
computing environments due to their openness and specific essence. In addition, the 
deployment of intrusion detection and prevention systems varies per solution and is 
something that is not cohesive in its approach. In the cloud environment, where massive 
amounts of data are generated due to high network access rates, an IDS must be robust 
against noise data and false positives. Since cloud infrastructures have enormous network 
traffic, traditional IDSs are not efficient to handle such a large flow of data. Due to the 
large data sets, classification techniques require a huge amount of memory and CPU 
usage. Failure is not an option in protecting critical infrastructure services in a federated 
cloud environment. We need a solution that can adapt itself to the ever-changing 
behaviour of the cloud environment. The cloud federation, and the CSPs, will benefit 
significantly if there is a comprehensive IDS that evolves based on their requirements. 
The security of applications and services provided in the cloud, against cyber attacks,  
is hard to achieve due to the complexity, heterogeneity, and dynamic nature of such 
systems. 
5 Conclusions and future work 
Cloud computing is being adopted in critical sectors such as transport, energy and 
finance. This makes cloud computing services critical in themselves. Adoption of cloud 
technologies allows critical infrastructure to benefit from dynamic resources allocation 
from managing unpredictable load peaks. Given the public awareness of critical 
infrastructure and its importance, the public wants to be assured that these systems are 
built to function in a secure manner. When cyber attacks and cyber disruptions happen, 
millions of users are potentially affected. A cyber disruption in this context means a 
temporary or permanent loss of service will mean users of the cloud service who rely on 
its continuity are affected. Intrusion detection and prevention methods are being 
developed to protect this sensitive information being stored, and the services being 
deployed. There needs to be an assurance that the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of the data and resources are maintained. Therefore recognising the signs of 
an attack quickly, and being able to limit the effect on operation is imperative. Cloud 
outages are unexpected events that occur within a cloud infrastructure and consequently 
affect availability of services placed in the cloud. Should this be critical infrastructure 
services, or important historical processes, this will not be good for the reputation of the 
infrastructure vendor, or for the cloud service provider. 
Our future work involves developing methods and principles to tackle network 
availability attacks against the cloud environment. Network attacks, such as DDoS, aim 
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to use up or overwhelm the communication and computational resources and to result in 
delay or failure of communication. The detection of subtle changes in behaviour can be 
achieved through the CUSUM algorithm. Having identified current method weaknesses, 
we aim to expand and develop a tailored protective approach, which can help protect and 
detect intrusions in the cloud environment. The concept of cloud federations is an avenue 
we aim to explore further as this may be a suitable environment for developing resilient 
solutions for cloud protection. 
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